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Abstract
We develop a two-stage experimental protocol by which i) we elicit the
social network within a group of undergraduate students and ii) we mea-
sure their altruistic attitudes by way of a standard Dictator game. We
observe that more socially integrated subjects are also more altruistic,
as betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree are positively correlated
with the level of giving, even after controlling for the e¤ect of social dis-
tance, which has been shown to a¤ect giving. Our ndings suggest that
social distance and network position are complementary determinants of
altruistic behavior.
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1 Motivation
The so-called Dictator Game is a classic experimental protocol by which a
subject (Dictator) decides unilaterally over the division of a xed amount of
money with another - usually anonymous - subject (Recipient). The anonymity
of the protocol may suggest that Dictators may well keep all the money for
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themselves. However, this selsh behavior is rarely observed in the lab. In
contrast, about 20% of the money is given to the Recipient under a wide variety
of experimental conditions. This evidence is usually interpreted as an instance
of altruistic behavior.1
In recent years, a large number of Dictator Game experiments have focused
on several factors that may play a role as determinants of giving. Among these,
we mention two streams of literature which are of interest for this paper:
1. framing e¤ects; the way in which the Dictators decision is presented to
the subjects inuences the results. One particular instance is the presence
of non-neutralsentences highlighting the Recipients dependency on the
Dictators decision.2
2. social distance; Dictator-Recipient and Dictator-Experimenter relation-
ships have shown to a¤ect the results. Social distance depends on the
degree of anonymity among all the parties involved and is induced by the
experimental conditions.3
This literature provides substantial evidence in support of the claim that
both factors have a signicant impact on the Dictators donation.
The notion of social distanceusually refers to the amount of information
provided to the Dictator on the identity of the Recipient and/or the Experi-
menter. There are three noticeable exceptions to this approach, namely Jones
and Rachlin (2006), Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al. (2009), where the
notion of social distance between two subjects is related to how close they
are in their real-life social network(e.g. whether they are friends, friends
of friends and so on). In this respect, the three studies show that altruis-
tic behavior is decreasing in the social distance between the Dictator and the
Recipient.
Nevertheless, this research leaves as an open question whether altruism is
not only related to the distance to the Recipient, but more generally to the
individualsnetwork position.4
The idea that altruism may be related to network position gets some support
from the literature on the coevolution of social networks and prosocial norms
(Eshel et al., 1998; Boyd and Richerson, 2002; Marsili et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006;
Cassar, 2007; Fosco and Mengel, 2008). This literature analyzes the interplay of
network structures and prosociality from a global perspective and show that so-
cial structures may contributre to the stability of prosocial behavior. However,
1See, among others, Ho¤man et al. (1994, 1996), Eckel and Grossman (1996) and Bolton
et al. (1998).
2See List (2007) for a survey and Brañas-Garza (2007) for an experimental study.
3See, among others, Bohnet and Frey (1999), Brañas-Garza (2006), Burnham (2003), Char-
ness and Gneezy (2008) and Ho¤man et al. (1994, 1996).
4Goeree et al. (2009) have also considered that individual network measures may a¤ect
altruism and use them as control variables, but their main focus is on the social distance to
Recipients and their personal characteristics (such as height or shyness). In their regression,
the inclusion of personal characteristics might be shading the e¤ect of individual network
measures.
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little is known about how the degree of altruism and network position relate at
the micro-level. In an evolutionary model, Fosco and Mengel (2008) show that
in the steady state, where selsh and prosocial individuals coexist, the former
are situated in the periphery of the network.5 Cassar (2007) reports a signif-
icant e¤ect of the number of neighbors (that is, a local measure of centrality)
on cooperation, despite the fact that the network position is imposed in her
experiment.6
The objective of the present paper is to test the following hypothesis: Do
socially integrated individuals exhibit more altruistic behavior, even after con-
trolling for framing e¤ects and social distance? With this question we would
like to contribute to the analysis of the relationship between social structures
and social norms by focusing on a particular dimension of social networks, so-
cial integration, considered both from a local (i.e. at the level of each subjects
neighborhood) and a global perspective (i.e. at the level of the whole network).
To this aim, we relate the measured level of altruism and the elicited real-
life social-network position of individuals. In contrast to Leider et al. (2009)
and Goeree et al. (2009), our data allow us to test whether this relation exists
not only when people know the network distance to the Recipient, but also in
an anonymous setting, where people do not know their identity. This design
feature allows us to isolate the e¤ect of network measures from that of social
distance to the Recipient.
To explore the hypothesis of the paper, we design a two-stage experiment
to elicit subjects social network in their section and then obtain an indirect
measure of their altruistic attitudes through the Dictator Game.
We use three treatment conditions which di¤er along/in the frame and
friendshipdimensions. Subjectswillingness to give is then related - together
with treatment conditions - to some classic measures of integration used in
network theory, such as
1. In-degree: the number of links leading to any given node (in our case the
number of subjects who name subject i as a friend);
2. Out-degree: the number of links starting from any given node (in our
case the number of friends named by subject i);
3. Reciprocal degree: the number of bidirectional links (elicited friendships
which are mutual);
5This is very well illustrated in Figure 1 of Fosco and Mengel (2008).
6A related idea is also present in the cross-cultural study of Henrich et al. (2001, 2004).
They provide evidence that cross-cultural di¤erences in prosocial behavior across small-scale
societies are largely due to the characteristics of social institutions. Since the map of social
relationships among the members of a society can be viewed as an informal institution, their
results would suggest that more socially integrated societies would more likely adhere to
a prosocial norm. Again, they leave the open question of whether, and if so how, social
integration at the individual level correlates with the degree of prosociality. This issue may
be very relevant in todays world, where most of the people belong to a "global" small-world
network (Watts, 1999). Ensminger (2004) reports evidence from a small society in Africa that
people who engage more often in non-kin business relationships with others tend to exhibit
more altrustic behavior in anonymous experiments.
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4. Betweenness centrality: the index which measures how centraleach
subject is by counting the number of shortest paths connecting any pair of
nodes in the network which pass through that particular subject. To ob-
tain this index, we need to look at the entire network architecture, instead
of simply considering the local properties of a given node.
These indexes measure the embeddedness (or integration) of a subject within
a social network. More precisely, degree measures reect the integration of each
subject within her local neighborhood, while betweenness centrality reects each
subjects integration within the social network as a whole.
Our experimental evidence conrms previous results showing that both fram-
ing and social distance are important determinants of giving behavior. However,
we show that framing and social distance do not a¤ect the probability of selsh
behavior (giving zero or the minimum possible amount).
More importantly, we observe that betweenness centrality and reciprocal
degree have a positive and signicant impact on subjectswillingness to give
and also on the probability of observing selsh behavior. In contrast, in-degree
(the subjects integration as perceived by others) and out-degree (the subjects
perceived integration within the group) are never signicant for giving.
Moreover, given that we can separate the e¤ect of network measures from
that of social distance, the results suggest that the e¤ect of individual network
position on giving is complementary to the e¤ect of social distance, previously
analyzed in the literature.7
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2 we present
the experimental design, while our experimental results are reported in Section
3. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 Design
The experiment was conducted at the University of Granada (Spain) in two ses-
sions held the same day in January 2006. Subjects were rst-year undergraduate
students in Economics in the same section. The recruitment was made exclu-
sively in the section and no one else was invited to participate in the experiment.
Participation was voluntary. The section list contained 105 students, but only
around 100 attended regularly and were aware of the experiment. The exper-
iment was announced in class and 79 students agreed to participate. In total,
90 students were somehow involved in the network elicitation stage of the ex-
periment, since 11 students from the same section were named as friends, but
did not participate in the experiment. The students in the section had been
attending the same courses for a whole semester so it is likely that at the time
of the experiment they had got to interact and build a social network. Since
rst-year students from di¤erent sections do not take courses together, the inter-
7This role of the network position is reinforced by the observation that it also matters for
the probability of selsh behavior, while framing and social distance do not.
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action across (within) sections is much weaker (stronger).8 This guarantees that
we have clearly dened group bounds, which, together with the high participa-
tion, enable us to elicit a considerable fraction of the underlying social network
of the population under study. We were extremely careful about preserving
subject-experimenter distance to avoid any e¤ects on subjectswillingness to
give. For this reason, the experiment was conducted by assistants who had had
no previous contact with our subjects.
2.1 Sequencing
The experiment was designed as a 2-stage protocol as follows:
Stage 1: Network Elicitation. The protocol for network elicitation was ex-
tremely simple: 79 subjects from the same section were asked to write down the
name of their friends from the same section on a piece of paper; one of whom
would have the chance to be beneted later in the experiment. In total, the
participating subjects named 79 names from the section list (68 were participat-
ing subjects and 11 were absent), creating 220 links among the students from
the section under study.9 At this stage, no information was provided about
the type of decisions they would make afterwards, or what the possible benet
would be. However, since we were interested in subjects revealing the identity
of their close friends, the instructions clearly stated that they might be given
the chance to benet only one of the friends, who would be randomly chosen
from their list. Therefore, the more friends they listed, the lower the chance of
beneting any particular individual.
Given the incentives provided in the elicitation procedure, we may be cap-
turing the network of people, who would like to benet each other. As a result,
we do not capture links to friends, whom our subjects would not like to see
beneted, while we might capture links to people our experimental subjects
would like to benet without being friends. Nevertheless, since beneting each
other is an essential feature of friendship relationships and we explicitely asked
for naming of friends, we interpret the elicted graph as the friendship network.
In particular, our elicitation device yields a network of close-friends,10 since
8There are over 500 rst-year undergraduate students in Economics at the University of
Granada. They are divided into sections, which are generally composed of slightly more than
100 students. The student population of the whole University is around 60 thousand.
9There were 11 named students from the section, who did not participate in the experiment.
We removed them from the empirical analysis and Figure 2. This a¤ected 13 links. As a result,
there are 79 nodes and 207 links in the subsequent analysis. In the main text, we focus only on
the participating students, because we have no information about whether these links would
have been reciprocated by the non-participating students, or about the giving decisions of these
absent individuals. All the analysis has also been replicated including the non-present students
in network measures and the results do not change. The analogous to Figure 2, including the
removed links, can be found at http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
10There is no ideal network elicitation mechanism. When extracting the social links in real
networks, scientists may always under- or overestimate the real network. Hence, it is better
to choose the elicitation device according to the aim of the study. When looking for a dense
but less precise network, one should provide incentives to report all the relations. On the
contrary, to assure that elicited links are "stronger" it is better to give incentives to name
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subjects were (made) aware of the fact that naming many friends would reduce
the probability of favoring any one of them.11
Stage 2: Dictator Game. In session 2 the 79 participants were divided
into 3 groups depending on the treatment (see Treatments below). Each
group made the experiment in a separate room, but simultaneously. For all the
treatments, subjects received two 11.5 x 22 cm. (4.5 x 8.8 in.) envelopes in
their hand-out package. One envelope was empty, while the other contained 10
fty-eurocent coins. The subjects were informed that their task was to divide
this 10-coin endowment between themselves and another subject in whatever
way they wished.12
2.2 Treatments
In the second stage, we had three block-design treatments structured according
to the following two dimensions which have been shown to signicantly a¤ect
subjectswillingness to give. The idea was to control for these conditions when
measuring the network e¤ectfocus of our analysis.
1. Friends/No Friends. Depending on the treatment, subjects knew from
the instructions whether the recipient would be a friend randomly drawn
from their own list (treatment Friends) or someone from their sec-
tion with the exception of the friends they had named (treatment No
Friends).
2. Frame/No Frame. We also controlled for another treatment condition:
framing. In this treatment half of the subjects who faced a no-friend as
a Recipient had an additional sentence framing the Dictator Game which
stated that the Recipient . . .would rely on them....
Thus, we had the following three treatments: Treatment 1, (No Friend/No
Frame, Baselinehereafter), Treatment 2 (No Friends/Frame, Framehere-
after) and Treatment 3 (Friends/No Frame, Friends hereafter), with 26, 26
and 27 subjects, respectively.13
Each participant in Stage 2 played as a Dictator and was also a potential
Recipient. The role of Recipients was randomly assigned from the section list,
fewer friends. We opted for the second option, because we were interested in strong ties,
which we nd more relevant for the analysis of generosity. For di¤erent applications it could
be more useful to elicit not only strong links. Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al. (2009),
for instance, use an incentive-based elicitation protocol in which subjectsmonetary gain is
non-decreasing in the number of elicited links and strictly increasing in the number of mutual
links. As a result, the number of elicited links is substantially higher.
11This feature of the mechanism was actually explicitly mentioned in the instructions by
stating Feel free to name as many friends as you wish. Remember, though, that the higher
the number of friends you list, the lower the chances of benetting a particular friend of
yours.
12The experimental instructions can be found at http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
13The introduction of the two treatments serves to see whether the e¤ect of network position
still matters even if framing and social distance play a role. Therefore, we did not tested the
joint e¤ect of framing and social distance in the experiment.
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exluding the named friends, in Baseline and Framing treatments, while in the
Friends treatment one subject from the list of friends was randomly drawn.
On average, subjects earned 4.5 euros (including a show-up fee of 2 euros).
The payments to Recipients were distributed after the second session.14
3 Results
Dictator Game
Figure 1 shows the box plots representing the distribution of Dictators
o¤ers in favor of the Recipient (integers from 0 to 6, given that no subject con-
tributed with more than 6 coins) in the three treatments.15 As Figure 1 shows,
the Dictator keeps, on average, 8 coins for herself and gives 2 to the Recipient in
the Baseline session. Very few Dictators (11%) shared their endowment equally,
while 19% behaved completely selshly and kept all the money for themselves.
These results are in line with analogous experiments and make us condent
that eliciting the network before the Dictator game did not a¤ect the play in
the game.16
Framing seems to enhance altruistic behavior as the entire distribution of
Treatment 2 shiftsup compared with the Baseline. As a consequence, equal
splitting becomes much more frequent (19% of total observations). Concerning
Treatment 3 (Friends), average o¤ers further increase as does their variability.
37% of subjects give (at least) half of the endowment. Standard t-tests show
that giving is signicantly larger in Friends and Framing treatments with respect
to the Baseline (t =  2:524, p = :007 and t =  2:437, p = :009, respectively;
one-tailed tests).
In contrast, the di¤erence between Framing and Friends is not statistically
signicant (t =  0:222, p = :825; two-tailed test). We see that the average
giving is virtually the same in both treatments. The only di¤erence is the
variability. Figure 1 suggests that the distribution of Dictatorsgifts is more
dispersed in Friends treatment.
The comparison of the results with Goeree et al. (2009) and Leider et al.
(2009) also suggests that our network elicitation mechanism does not induce any
behavioral bias into the Dictatorsdecisions. In the present study, the di¤erence
between Baseline and Friends treatments shows that subjects give 49% more to
their friends with respect to any random individual at a distance larger than
one. Goeree et al. (2009) report 36% larger giving to rst-order neighbours
with respect to more distant individuals, while Leider et al. (2009) observe an
14Since Recepients have been drawn randomly from the complete section list in case of
Baseline and from the friend list in the Friends treatment, some Recipients were absent.
These were contacted and paid later.
15The boxes show 50% of the total observations (from the 25% to the 75% percentile).
Adjacent lines trace the rst upper and lower adjacent values, while points denote outliers.
The line within the box denotes the median. The broken line connects the means of the three
distributions.
16See Ho¤man et al. (1996) and Eckel and Grossman (1996).
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increase of 52% in giving to rst-order neighbours rather than strangers. The
e¤ect in our experiment lies between these two values.
Fig. 1: Distributions of Dictatorsgiving in Stage 2
Network
Figure 2 provides us with a mapping of the directed network (from the
subject naming a friend to the named subject) of our experimental subject
pool. Each subject is represented by a circle. The black nodes correspond to
"selsh" individuals, i.e. subjects who gave nothing or the smallest possible
amount (about 19% of our subject pool), while the white nodes are subjects
who gave more than one. On average, subjects named 2.78 including links to
non-participating students, and were named by 2.62 friends.17 The degree of
reciprocation is 50.5% in the data. This percentage is higher than in other
studies. Leider et al. (2009) report 36.7% of reciprocal links and the fraction
is roughly 30% in Add Health data (Goodreau, 2007).18 High reciprocity with
respect to other studies, jointly with lower average degrees, conrms that our
elicitation procedure is more suitable for elicitation of close relationships.19
There are two salient features of the network architecture. First, most of the
nodes are embedded in a giant component (i.e. they are connected through
some path). Second, the architecture of this component is a combination of
interlinked clusters, either in the form of stars or (almost) complete graphs. A
more detailed analysis shows that our network resembles standard social network
17The histograms for indegree and outdegree, as well as reciprocal degree and betweenness,
can be found at http://www.ugr.es/~pbg/material/network.htm.
18Goeree et al. (2009) do not report this statistic.
19The average indegrees are around 10 and 4.4 for Leider et al. (2009) and Goeree et al.
(2009), respectively.
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structures, that is, relatively low average distances, and high clustering with
respect to a random network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). The average distance
between reachable nodes, that is between the nodes in the giant component,
is 5.4, abstracting from the directionality of links. Since this number is of the
order of logarithm of the size of the network (log(79) ' 4:369), we can say that
the average distances are low in the data. The average clustering coe¢ cient
(i.e. the relative frequency of neighbors who are directly linked themselves) is
0.38 (st.dev. 0.29). In a large randomly generated network with n nodes and
average degree of d, the expected clustering coe¢ cient would be roughly dn . For
a random network with our size and connectivity, we get 0.03. This number is
an order of magnitude lower that the clustering observed in the elicited network.
Additionally, we nd that our network shows positive assortativity: those who
are more social tend to be connected to social individuals.20 Most of these
features have been found in other empirical social networks (see Goyal (2007)
or Jackson (2008)).21
Figure 2 also provides a rough idea of our main result: less central subjects
are more likely to give less. Abstracting from the direction of nodes, note that, in
general, the position of the black nodes in the graph is either peripheral (subjects
6, 20, 24, 46, and 59) or they are embedded in completely connected clusters
(2, 29, 34, 37, 38, 50, 63, and 66). In both cases, the potential removal of these
nodes does not have a large e¤ect on the (inter)connectivity of the remaining
nodes,22 that is, these nodes are not crucial for the network architecture.23
20Using the coe¢ cient of assortativity proposed by Newman (2002), we nd positive assor-
tativity in our data (r = 0:19 for in-degree and rises to r = 0:50 for reciprocal degree).
21Even though positive assortativity is observed in many social networks, Jackson (2008,
Chapter 3.2.4) correctly points out that there are too many exceptions, and makes a call for
a more systematic analysis of this issue.
22Even though the removal of subject 50 would disconnect subject 26, this e¤ect is weak on
the overall connectivity of the network.
23An exception seems to be subject 12, who creates a bridge between two components.
However, she names three nodes as her friends, but none of these links is actually reciprocated.
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Fig. 2: Social links and contribution profiles
Clearly, the analysis of Figure 2 does not properly account for treatment
conditions. In Table 1 we perform a regression analysis including treatment
variables. Network centrality is captured through binary indexes24 which take
value 1 if the corresponding subject is characterized by a level above the median
of the corresponding centrality measure (in-degree, out-degree, reciprocal degree
and betweenness) and 0 otherwise.
We run two types of regressions. In the rst case, regressions [1a] to [4a], we
use altruism as a dependent variable, whereas regressions [1b] to [4b] analyze
selshness. Each of the four models considers one network measure (in-degree,
out-degree, reciprocal degree and betweenness). More precisely,
Regress. [1a] to [4a]: the probability of any possible level of giving (an integer from 0 to 6) is
estimated by an ordered logit regression using network measures, gender25
and treatment dummies (Friends and Framing) as explanatory variables.
Regress. [1b] to [4b]: the probability of belonging to the group of selsh" subjects (see Figure
2) is estimated by a logit regression using network measures, a constant,
gender and treatment dummies as explanatory variables.
24We use dummies to better capture non-linearities in the underlying relations. Analogous
results can be obtained using the indexes and the indexes squared.
25We control for gender, since it has been observed that women tend to be more generous
than men (see, for example, Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, in press, and
Eckel and Grossman, 1998).
10
Table 1: Regressions for Giving and Selfishness
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b]
In-degree .228 -1.179* - - - - - -
(.424) (.695) - - - - - -
Out-degree - - -.361 -.240 - - - -
- - (.478) (.765) - - - -
Rec. degr. - - - - 1.001** -1.750** - -
- - - - (.454) (.805) - -
Between. - - - - - - 1.037** -1.790***
- - - - - - (.473) (.712)
Gender .959** -1.035 1.123** -1.271** .678 -.963 .666 -.875
(.451) (.630) (.464) (.646) (.463) (.641) (.466) (.653)
Friends 1.788*** -.835 1.649*** -.600 2.028*** -1.226 1.900*** -1.018
(.546) (.730) (.559) (.729) (.556) (.786) (.550) (.765)
Fram. 1.409*** -1.385* 1.278** -1.150 1.620*** -1.718** 1.480*** -1.483*
(.513) (.814) (.515) (.806) (.522) (.868) (.511) (.851)
Cons. - .281 - -.198 - .594 - .644
(.641) (.606) (.701) (.690)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79,(P>{2)<.05.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
In Table 1, the coe¢ cients in regressions [1a] to [4a] measure the average
percentage increase in giving for subjects with network measures abouve the
median, while in regressions [1b] to [4b] they measure the percentage increase
in the probability of showing a selsh behavior.
First, notice that betweenness centrality and reciprocal degree coe¢ cients
are always signicant. The negative sign of the coe¢ cients of these variables in
regressions [3b] and [4b] indicates that a subject with a high reciprocal degree
or betweenness is less likely to be selsh. The positive signs of the coe¢ cients in
regressions [3a] and [4a] show that these measures of integration have a positive
e¤ect on the level of giving. In contrast, neither out-degree nor in-degree is
signicant at 5% in our models.
The second pattern worth stressing is the nding that treatment variables
(Friends and Framing) have a large and signicant impact in equations [1a] to
[4a], while they are (almost) never signicant at 5% in regressions [1b] to [4b].
In other words, our treatment variables a¤ect the level of giving, but they have
no e¤ect on whether subjects belong to the group of most selsh individuals.
The rst part of this nding, the inuence of treatment variables of the level
of giving, is known: both social distance and framing have a positive e¤ect
on the level of giving. Our treatment variable Friends measures the e¤ect of
social distance (when Friends = 1; the Dictator shares her endowment with a
subject at distance onefrom her, whereas the distance between the Dictator
and the Recipient is larger when Friends = 0): In this respect, our estimates
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conrm previous results in the literature: people are more altruistic toward
socially closer individuals (see also Figure 1). Similar considerations apply for
the Framing e¤ect.
However, the probability of a selsh o¤er does not seem to be a¤ected as
much by the treatment variables (Friends is never signicant and Framing is
signicant at 5% only in regression [3b]). Playing with friends does not have
an impact on the probability of selsh behavior, but it does a¤ect the level of
giving. For the other treatment variable, Framing, its e¤ect is also stronger on
the level of giving than on the probability of selsh behavior.
To interpret these results, let us remember that betweenness is a global
measure of a subjects social integration, while the degree measures concern
integration at a local level. In-degree and out-degree reect local integration,
either as it is perceived by others (the number of subjects who consider i as
a friend), or by the subject herself (the number of subjects that i considers as
friends). Finally, reciprocal degree includes aspects of the last two and requires
a coincidence between is perceptions and those of others, given the additional
requirement of reciprocity.26 In this respect, our results indicate that only
"strong" measures of social integration matter for altruism. At a local level,
we have shown that reciprocal degree is highly signicant both for the level of
giving and for the probability of selsh behavior. The same result holds for the
global measure of social integration.
We have identied a link between social integration and altruism which be-
comes stronger, the stronger the corresponding measure. Hence, both globally
and locally, more integrated subjects tend to be more altruistic, even after con-
trolling for gender and treatment e¤ects.
Given the complementary role of social distance and centrality in giving be-
havior, we also checked whether the e¤ect of centrality may be inuenced by
social distance. Table 2 in the appendix shows that this is not so in any of regres-
sions from Table 1. The dummy for the interaction between the corresponding
measure of centrality and Friends is never signicant.
To test the robustness of the main nding of this paper, the link between
network centrality and altruism, we ran the regressions from Table 1 excluding
the observations from the Friends treatment. As Table 3 in Appendix reports,
the ndings are not driven by the Friends treatment and hold even when people
only deal with non-friends.
Last, we ran regressions of the same dependent variables over two alternative
measures of network position of individuals: clustering coe¢ cient and Bonacich
eigenvector centrality. The former measures the frequency of neighbors of a
particular node that are neighbors themselves, while the latter is an alternative
measure of centrality, which takes into account all paths starting from a node,
including non-directed ones. There is no signicant relation between our de-
pendent variables and these two measures (p > :32 in all cases) and none of the
models is jointly statistically signicant on traditional 5% signicance level (see
26Reciprocity is actually one of the requirements listed by Granovetter (1973) to distinguish
between weakand strong ties.
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Table 4 in Appendix).
4 Discussion
This paper explores the relationship between social integration and altruistic
behavior. Our results show that social network architecture matters for altru-
ism at both the local and the global level. We control for other signicant
factors already highlighted in the literature such as gender, framing or social
distance. Even after controlling for these variables, social integration remains
an important factor for giving and selsh behavior.
Our main contribution is thus the idea that the e¤ect of social distance,
previously analyzed in the literature, is complementary to the e¤ect of network
position and that both seems to be important determinants of altruism.
Our statistical exercise in Table 1 would seem to suggest a causal relationship
between network centrality and altruism, since network variables are in the
list of regressors.27 This estimation strategy follows the empirical literature on
network/peer e¤ects in which network architecture is a primitive of the economic
environment. Nevertheless, the authors of this literature are well aware of the
fact that subjectsindividual characteristics may also inuence their position in
the network, making it di¢ cult to disentangle the pure network e¤ect from
individual heterogeneity (Durlauf, 2008).
In the context of our data set, the same dilemma can be posed as follows:
Are subjects (on average) more altruistic because they are pivotal in their social
network, or are they pivotal because they show (for whatever reason) a more
altruistic attitude toward the rest of the group? Concerning this point, it is
worth mentioning the vast experimental evidence on the persistence of sharing
rules across life stages. This literature reports that there is a certain evolution
of the norm adherence during childhood, but once early adulthood is reached,
the norm adherence seems to remain constant (Benenson et al. 2007; Krause
and Harbaugh, 2000; Sutter and Kocher; 2007). Since our experimental subjects
are university undergraduates, it is reasonable to assume that these prosocial
processes are already well established for our subject pool, thus contributing to
the dynamics of friendship network formation. For this reason, it may well be
the case that an individual altruistic attitude may favor greater integration in
the social network.
In our experimental protocol, even though the decision of giving was made
after the network elicitation and the social network of Figure 2 was already well
established at the time subjects had to make their contribution decision,28 it
is clear that both the social abilities and the social norms of the subjects as
well as personality traits were determined long before the experiment.29 Our
27This is also the same estimation strategy followed in the experimental papers of Leider et
al. (2007) and Jones and Rachlin (2006).
28Note also that Stage 1 decisions contribute to the matching protocol of Stage 2 (and in
this sense, network elicitation a¤ects giving decisions, albeit indirectly).
29A recent paper by Fowler et al. (2009) indeed suggests that network position may be
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interpretation of the results is that given the social abilities and norms of the
individuals, they formed a social network in their class and in that social network
we measured their willingness to share a given endowment. Our analysis allows
us to state that their behavior in sharing the endowment (i.e. their generosity)
with other members of the network is a¤ected by their position in that network.
A very similar problem is faced by Calvó-Armengol et al. (2005), who es-
timate peer group e¤ects in education patterns of a sample of US adolescents.
The richness of their database -the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent
Health, the "Add Health"- allows them to mitigate this problem by controlling
for proxies of leadershipand self-esteemwhich are correlated with the vari-
able of interest, but also can a¤ect subjectsposition in their social network.
Our data does not allow us to replicate such an estimation strategy. However,
experimental methods could allow us to control network dynamics and their
coevolution with subjects behavioral treatments in much more detail. The
analysis of this question is left for future research.
partially genetically determined.
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5 Appendix
Table 2: Regressions for Giving and Selfish. with Interactions
Indegree centr. Out-Degree centr. Rec. Degree centr. Betweenness centr.
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[5a] [5b] [6a] [6b] [7a] [7b] [8a] [8b]
Centrality .241 -1.353 -.743 -.240 1.109** -1.750** 1.086** -1.790***
(.456) .892 (.485) (.765) (.484) (.805) (.449) (.712)
Centr.  Friends .227 .321 1.473 (a) -.071 (a) -.149 (a)
(978) (1.493) (1.138) (.930) (1.088)
Gender .775 -.984 .959** -1.271** .505 -.963 .639 -.875
(.486) (.618) (.481) (.646) (.520) (.641) (.486) (.653)
Friends 1.500* -.884 1.081 -.600 1.912** -1.226 1.716* -1.018
(857) (.872) (.718) (.729) (.810) (.786) (1.038) (.765)
Fram. 1.246*** -1.367 1.026** -1.150 1.489*** -1.718** 1.432*** -1.483*
(.497) (.887) (.508) (.806) (.482) (.868) (.494) (.851)
Cons. - 1.259 - -.198 - .594 - .644
(1.036) (.606) (.701) (.690)
(a) variable dropped. Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79, (P>{2)<.1.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
Table 3: Regressions for Non-Friends Treatments
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[9a] [9b] [10a] [10b] [11a] [11b] [12a] [12b]
In-degree .289 -1.347 - - - - - -
(.516) (.904)
Out-degree - - -.814 .497 - - - -
(.546) (.957)
Rec. degr. - - - - 1.351** -1.566 - -
(.578) (.988)
Between. - - - - - - 1.271** -1.914**
- - - - - - (.514) (.886)
Gender .646 -1.068 .952 -1.391 .264 -1.018 .478 -1.048
(.641) (-779) (.614) (.869) (.702) (.776) (.634) (.805)
Fram. 1.415** -1.369 1.187** -.932 1.733*** -1.598* 1.646*** -1.509*
(.595) (.893) (.599) (.864) (.585) (.978) (.603) (.817)
Cons. - 1.383 - .924 - 1.493 - 1.530
(1.215) (1.181) (1.203) (1.349)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=52,(P>{2)<.1
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
18
Table 4: Regressions for Giving and Selshness
over Clustering and Eigenvector Centrality
Altruism Selsh Altruism Selsh
[13a] [13b] [14a] [14b]
Clustering -.200 .428 - -
(.442) (.650) - -
Eigenvector centrality - - .165 -.548
- - (.442) (.633)
Gender .916* -1.322** .792 -.999*
(.494) (.645) (.508) (.605)
Friends 1.542** -.457 1.578*** -.616
(.628) (.696) (.602) (.648)
Fram. 1.158** -1.008 1.231** -1.210
(.498) (.783) (.483) .826
Cons. - .805 - .866
(1.008) (1.000)
Standard errors are in parentheses. N=79,(P>{2)>.05.
***, **, and * indicate signicance at p = 0.01,0.05 and 0.10, resp.
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